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Abstract
Many scholars address the indirect effects presidents have on midterm election results by examining the “midterm loss” phenomenon, presidential coattails, negative
voting, and the “referendum” thesis. However, very little research investigates the direct effect that presidential campaigning has on congressional candidates prospects for
victory. This study adds to this growing literature by exploring presidential campaigning in the 2002 and 2006 U.S. Senate midterm elections. Our investigation makes two
important contributions to previous research. First, we explicitly model the strategic
decisions presidents make in visiting states in order to get a better estimate of presidential impact that accounts for selection bias. Second, we take advantage of a natural
experiment between 2002 and 2006 to test the importance of presidential popularity
in driving campaign effects. Although we expect presidents to primarily campaign in
states where he believes he will be effective–an efficiency argument–we argue that the
size of that effect depends very clearly on his own popularity. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding the role of the president in modern American
electoral politics.

Introduction
Many scholars have addressed the indirect effects presidents can have on midterm elections by examining the “midterm loss” phenomenon (Tufte 1975), presidential coattails
(???), negative voting and the “referendum” thesis (?????). However, few have examined
the direct effects a president can have on midterm elections by campaigning for candidates
(??). This paper attempts add to this growing discussion in the literature and explore the
direct impact of presidential campaigning on U.S. midterm Senate elections using data from
the 2002 and 2006 midterm elections.
Specifically, we examine the effect of campaigning for Senate candidates by President
George W. Bush during the 2002 and 2006 midterm election campaigns. Our investigation
makes two important contributions to previous research. First, we explicitly model the
strategic decisions presidents make in visiting states in order to get a better estimate of
presidential impact that accounts for selection bias. Second, we take advantage of a natural
experiment between 2002 and 2006 to test the importance of presidential popularity in
driving campaign effects. We investigate to what extent President Bush may have directly
influenced these two midterm elections and how his popularity affected his ability to influence
the elections. Although we expect presidents to primarily campaign in states where he
believes he will be effective–an efficiency argument–we argue that the size of that effect
depends very clearly on his own popularity.

Presidential Campaigning for Senators
Scholars have found that campaigns matter and have the potential to influence the public’s political attitudes and political behavior (??). ? argue that presidential campaigning
can help mobilize voters and be a decisive factor in a close election, which “attests strongly
to the power of the presidency” (176). However, becuase presidents have little time to do
1

more than their presidential duties require, they must make strategic decisions during campaigns about where their presence will be most effective (??). Hoddie and Routh (2004)
argue that that there are fewer personal stakes for the president in midterm elections than
in the general election, so the strategy he uses will differ from his own campaign strategy. In
midterm elections, a president is not likely to campaign for a candidate who is sure to win
or sure to lose, and presidents will be more likely to campaign for a member of their party
when they think they can positively impact the results of the election.
Why does the president choose to devote some of his valuable time to campaigning for
other politicians? One reason that a president may campaign for members of his party is to
secure a favorable congress. With very rare exceptions, members of the president’s party are
more likely to support his legislative agenda than members of the opposition party. If the
president’s party is in danger of losing an important seat in the congress, and the president
thinks he can positively affect the outcome in that race, he may campaign for the candidate
running for that seat. The president may have particular interest in protecting the seat held
by a candidate who is very supportive of the president’s agenda and who is ideologically
close to the president.
In allocating his time and resources, a president may choose to campaign for an incumbent
senator over a House member because “Senate incumbents have greater difficulty holding
their seats than House incumbents” (Abramowitz 1988, 386). Given that “the midterm
election is a period of low voter stimulation” (Kernell 1977, 63), a president who is popular
in a given state may choose to campaign for that state’s senatorial candidate in hopes of
mobilizing supportive voters for that candidate. The president hopes that the voters who
supported him in the previous presidential election will also support his party in the midterm
election (?).
Hoddie and Routh (2004) note that it is possible a president may use the midterm election
as an “opportunity to reward friends and contributors with a campaign visit as opposed to
2

developing a broader electoral plan designed to benefit his political party or legislative priorities” (257). If this were the case, we would be unable to predict where the president would
prioritize his campaign activities. However, if the president were strategically campaigning to ensure that his party gain or maintain a “favorable configuration” in Congress, his
campaign activity should be predictable. Hoddie and Routh (2004) find evidence that presidential campaigning activity in midterm elections can be predicted, and one of the strongest
variables they find for predicting presidential campaign visits is presidential popularity.

Presidential Approval
Presidents may be effective campaigners, but the direction and size of that effect depends
on how popular the president is among the constituents of the candidate the president is
campaigning for. Politicians think the public holds the presidents’ party responsible for the
“performance” of government (Kernell 1977) and a popular president may choose to help a
candidate’s chances in the election by campaigning for him or her.
The president takes several risks when he campaigns for someone. If the president chooses
to campaign for a candidate, he risks losing “public prestige” in the event that the candidate
loses the election. Also, the candidate’s opponent may become increasingly active against the
president. If the president is unpopular, campaigning for a candidate may actually improve
“the opponent’s ability to secure financing or. . . [increase the opponent’s] popularity among
constituent groups” (Cohen, Krassa, and Hamman 1991, 168). In fact, as stated above,
Kernell (1977) found that “disapproval of the President’s job performance is associated with
higher midterm turnout” (61), so an unpopular president may unintentionally mobilize voters
who are likely to vote against his party’s candidates.
Presidential “coattails” refers to the effect the public’s perception of the president has
on voter’s choice for candidates running for other offices. From what we understand, the
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presidential coattail theory is slightly different from the referendum theory. The referendum theory is an evaluation of the job the president is doing and it is more susceptible to
“negative voting.” The presidential coattail theory is more related to positive evaluations of
the president where the positive perceptions of the president held by the public can have a
positive effect on the public’s evaluations of candidates who are members of the president’s
party.
? attempts to answer the question: “to what extent do presidential coattails affect the
partisan distribution of seats in the House of Representatives” (165)? He claims that his
“coattail model” explains more than 80 percent of the variance from 1900 to 1980 and more
than 90 percent of the variance in the two other series. He concludes that “all things being
equal, a party can expect in recent elections a net gain of three seats in the House for every
additional percentage point of the two-party vote won by the party’s presidential candidate”
(165). The coattail effect also seems to depend on how many seats the party had in Congress
prior to the midterm election.
In a subsequent article, Campbell and Sumners (1990) attempt to “determine to what
extent and how presidential and Senate voting are related” in an election, and “to what
extent, if any, do presidential candidates offer coattails to Senate candidates” (514). They
find evidence of presidential coattails having an effect on the vote for Senate candidates, but
there is no evidence of “reverse coattails” where the Senate candidate has an effect on the
vote for president. ? finds that coattails appear to be more helpful to Republican candidates
than Democratic candidates in the races he examines.
Typically, the incumbent president’s party loses seats in midterm elections; this is known
as the “midterm loss” phenomenon (?). ? proposes a combination of the referendum and
negative voting explanations for the “loss” patterns observed in midterm elections. He argues
that when voters are unable to show their dissatisfaction with the incumbent president
by voting against him personally (since he is not on the midterm election ballot), these
4

dissatisfied voters “take out their discontent” on the members of the president’s party who
are on the ballot. Abramowitz then says that “in midterm elections, negative evaluations
of the incumbent president may have a stronger impact on voting decision than positive
evaluations” (1988, 398). If the referendum/negative voting combination theory is accurate,
the president would not want to campaign for candidates in states where he is unpopular.
If he did, he may cause the negative effect to intensify.

The Bush Presidency
Previous studies have shown that certain national conditions can affect how people vote
for senators (Gartner and Segura 2008). The presidency of George W. Bush has been very
eventful to say the least, and it is important to understand the national events that have
shaped his presidency, affected his popularity, and could possibly have had an impact on the
way people voted in the 2002 and 2006 midterm elections.
In 2002, President Bush became the second since Franklin Delano Roosevelt to see his
party gain seats in a midterm election. In 1998, Bill Clinton was the first. ? says that
“two specific factors seemed to have been most important in allowing Bush to translate
his popularity into vote gains for his party: 1) his active campaigning, and 2) the war on
terrorism.” At the time of the 2002 midterm election, the president had a fairly high national
level of popularity at around 63 percent (?). The day before the election, Gallup surveyed
likely voters and found that 35 percent of the voters ”said they were sending a message of
support for Bush with their vote, and 18% said they were sending a message of opposition” ?.
Accroding to ? “Bush was given substantial credit not only for maintaining his tremendous
hold over one chamber of Congress, but also for actually gaining seats in both the Senate
and House of Representatives” (2).
However, by the 2006 midterm election, President Bush’s popularity had reached a very
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low national level at around 36 percent (Jones 2008). His average popularity for all of 2006
was 33.3 percent (Jones 2008). According to ?, “much media attention was paid to President
George W. Bush’s declining popularity and the public’s dissatisfaction with the Republicancontrolled Congress” (139). In the end, the Democratic party did not lose one seat and
gained six new seats (which had been held by Republicans) giving the Democrats majorities
in both the House and the Senate (Gartner and Segura 2008, 95).

Hypotheses
What conditions influenced President Bush’s decisions to choose some Senate candidates
over others in the 2002 and 2006 midterm elections? And did the change in his national and
state popularity levels alter his campaign strategies from one midterm election to another?
Well, it makes sense that the president would choose to campaign in places where he will
be most effective. It is unlikely that he will campaign for a senator in a state where he is
terribly unpopular or where the candidate is sure to win (or to lose) (?) regardless of the
president’s acitons.
The president will therefore visit states where the election is likely to be a close one;
the president’s popularity, the vote spread in the previous election between the president
and the challenger, and the incumbency status of the candidate can provide clues about
whether the election will be close. Also, since it is more risky for the president to support
nonincumbents than it is for him to support incumbents (because incumbents have the
“incumbency advantage”) his willingness to campaign for nonincumbents will vary with his
popularity at the national and state level.
If the nonincumbent loses the election, the president may be blamed for that loss. Being
associated with a losing candidate ‘harms his reputation” (Cohen, Krassa and Hamman
1991, 166), so if the president already has low popularity levels, he will be less likely to
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campaign for nonincumbents. If the nonincumbent wins, it is unlikely that the president
will be given credit for the win. However, if the president has a high approval rating, he will
be more likely to take risks and campaign for a few nonimcumbents in close races. In 2002,
President Bush had a high approval rating and he made campaign appearances for several
nonincumbents. In 2006 President Bush campaigned for fewer nonincumbents (and fewer
candidates in general) than he did in 2002.
The president may develop a strategy of campaigning for candidates in order to secure a
favorable congress. The president will want to campaign for candidates who are supportive
of his agenda and who are ideologically in line with the president. The president’s persuasive
power was lower in 2006 than in 2002 since he was very unpopular (which cost him much
of his persuasive power); this created even more of an incentive for the president to retain
influence over the congress.
In midterm elections, when the president campaigns for a candidate he hopes those who
supported his campaign two years prior will show up to support the midterm candate (?).
Also, a president may also use a midterm election during his first term to boost support
for his own reelection campaign; therefore he will want to visit states with large Electoral
College values. If the midterm campaign is successful for the member of his party, that
member may help the president by supporting him in the following presidential election.
Campaigning for Senate candidates may also grab attention of local news media and help
the president build grassroots support for his next campaign.
Aside from presidential campaign appearances for a Senate candidate, campaign spending
has been found to have a substantial effect on the outcome of Senate elections (?). A spending
advantage combined with an incumbency advantage can increase the incumbent’s vote share
by six percent on average according to ?. Therefore, incumbents who outspend challengers
are almost sure to win in a close election, and it is unlikely that the president would make
an appearance for incumbents in this case.
7

We expect that presidential visits for Senate candidates can be predicted by the competitiveness of the race, the president’s popularity in the candidate’s state, the candidate’s
incumbency status, whether the incumbent candidate has a spending advantage, the senate
candidate’s ideology and support for the president’s agenda, the number of Electoral College votes the state has, and the president’s margin of victory in the previous presidential
election. It is also important to take into account the specific year; for example, 2002 versus
2006 provides a great natural experiment that will allow us to explore differences in presidential campaign behavior when he is very popular versus very unpopular. President Bush
should be more influential and more willing to take campaigning risks in 2002 when he is
more popular than in 2006 when he is far less popular.

Data
As our focus at this point in time is on midterm campaigning during the Bush years, we
use data on Republican races for the Senate in 2002 and 2006. Although president’s also
campaign for a select set of House races, it is difficult to establish when the president makes
campaign visits on behalf of House candidates. Moreover, focusing on the Senate gives us
some the opportunity to test whether strategic aspects of presidential electoral politics—e.g.,
a state’s number of Electoral College votes—impact behavior at the midterm.
Our unit of analysis for these data is the Senate election, rather than a particular person
or candidate. With thirty-three races in both 2002 and 2006, this provides us with an N
of sixty-six cases. In most cases, our variables measure either characteristics of the state
or the race. However, for some of our political variables they are measured in terms of the
incumbent party or incumbent party legislator. For example, in measuring the amount of
support the president received from that seat, we have to use the presidential support score
of the legislator who held the seat in the year prior to the election, even if that Senator did
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not run for reelection. A full list of the variables we use in our analysis, along with their
definitions and summary statistics, are provided in Table 1.

Dependent Variables
We are interested in explaining two separate processes. The first of these are the strategic
dimensions of presidential campaigning. Stated simply, what explains a president’s desire to
campaign on behalf of a particular candidate for the U.S. Senate? This is measured with a
dichotomous variable that says whether or not President Bush visisted a state for the purpose
of helping a particular Republican candidate. To measure this variable, we examined the
official White House schedule for the president. (Jessica...you’ll probably need to be more
specific about what you did than what I can accomplish here.) In line with what previous
research leads us to expect, President Bush campaign selectively. With 33 seats up for grabs
in both 2002 and 2006 he made only 12 and 9 campaign visits, respectively. If we add the
First Lady into the analysis, we see even more variation as she visited 8 states in 2006 and
none in 2002.1
The second dependent variable is the Republican share of the Senate election vote, which
we will use to investigate the effect of presidential politics on midterm elections. There is
significantly more variation on this variable, with a mean of 49%, a standard variation of
16.7%, and values that range from just 10% to 87%. As you might expect, the distribution
of this variable differs substantially in our two midterm years. The mean is 54% in 2002
when President Bush was relatively popular, with a range of 22% to 85%. In the more
bleak environment for Republicans of 2006, the mean was 44% with a minimum of 9% and
a maximum of 87%. As these year-by-year differences are not entirely a function of the
support for the president—economic and foreign policy issues undoubtedly helped produce
1

Interestingly, only four of Mrs. Bush’s campaign visits overlaped with the president. The four Republican
candidates who received visits from both members of the First Family were Jon Kyl, Mark Kennedy, Jim
Talent, and Conrad Burns.
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these differences as well—we must control for them below. At the same time, we keep in
mind the possibility that the effect of presidential politics through legislative support and
campaigning might also themselves hold different consequences in the two years.

Independent Variables
Although we examine a variety of different variables, three of them are of primary interest
because they help us understand the impact of presidential politics on midterm elections.
The first is presidential campaign visists, discussed above. The other two are the president’s
popularity in the state and the second is his level of legislative support from the state. The
first of these variables is measured as the Bush margin of victory in the preceding presidential
election, consistent with previous research by Hoddie and Roth. On average, Bush won by
a margin of 6% in the entire data set, ranging from -29% to 45%. The only significant
differences between 2002 and 2006 on this variable is in the mean, which goes from 9% to
4% in the two years.
Presidential support in the legislature is measured using the standard CQ estimate of how
frequently an incumbent senator voted with the president on those bills for which he had a
public position. To account for the lag time between legislative behavior and the ability of
the public to use this in evaluating candidates, we use the score of the incumbent legislator
in the year prior to the election. This creates one interesting wrinkle to keep in mind – if it
is an open seat, we are using the score of a candidate not in the election. We justify this on
the following basis – the election represents an opportunity to change away from something
very favorable, very unfavorable, or simply average whether or not the incumbent remains
in the race. Whatever effect this particular decision may have on the data can be controlled
for with a variable covering the status of the race as open or not.
The mean level of support by this standard is 82% in 2001 and 59% in 2005. While it is
possible that some of this is a function of the staggered election cycled in the Senate, there
10

were nearly the same number of Republican incumbents up for election with an average
ideology score (measured with NOMINATE) of .4 and .33 in both years. Also of note is
that the standard deviation of this variable is far lower in 2002 (14%) than in 2006 (26%),
suggesting that support for the president was more of an issue in the second midterm than
in the first. In part this is because there were more differences between incumbent legislators
on this score, but also because the president himself had become less popular by 2006.

Analysis
Presidential Campaigning in 2002 and 2006
We will beging our analysis by considering the logic of presidential campaigning, the
first of our dependent variables. We do by first examining the joint distribution of both
of our dependent variables because it sheds light on the strategic context of presidential
campaigning, a primary mode by which presidents are thought to influence Senate elections.
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the percentage of votes gained by Republican candidates
by whether or not they received a presidential campaign visit in 2002 or 2006. The most
pertient observation we gain from this display is that President Bush visited a very select
subset of races. In both campaign years, the bulk of the distribution lies on the 40% to
60% interval that covers the most competive races. The distributions for races that did not
receive presidential campaign visits are flatter and cover a wider range of the 0% to 100%
range.
Substantively, this graphs shows that the logic of presidential campaign visits matches
the logic of presidential campaigning ? in a very important way. Just as presidential candidates do not campaign in those states where one party is sure to win and to focus only on
those that are likely to be competitive, they only campaign for senatorial candidates who
are in relatively closer races. Importantly, this is just as true in 2006 when President Bush
11

Figure 1: Histograms of Senate Election Races and Bush Campaigning

was highly unpopular as in 2002 when he was more popular. This suggest that presidential popularity is less important for understanding the strategic dimensions of presidential
campaigning that one might expect. When popular, it does not look as if the president
reached into races that were seemingly less competitive in an effort to raise them up and
make them more competitive. When unpopular, he neither did that nor did he campaign in
those races where Republicans were more likely to win in an effort to highlight his support.
While it is true that the standard deviation is higher for races President Bush visited in 2006
than in 2002 (2.4 compared to 1.2), a means difference test of the two shows no difference
(dif f = 3.2, t = 1.29, p = .10 for one-tailed test).2
2

One potential objection to our discussion here is that presidential visits might have taken a race that
was initially uncompetitive and transformed it into a race that ended up more competively. Although we do
not have the polling data necessary to test this argument, two pieces of evidence argue against it. First, if
that were the case then we might expect some sort of “reverse effect” in 2006 where an unpopular president
visited a campaign and made it less competitive, something for which there is no evidence. Second, we
would also likely find competitive Senate races in states where the presidential race is itself also competitive.
However, there is no statistically significant difference in the presidential margin of victory in 2000 or 2004
between those states that did and did not receive visits in 2006, respectively.
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What this graph also shows, however, is that an endogeneous relationship between presidential campaigning and the competitiveness of races. As an empirical matter, this means
that any correlational estimate of the effect of one on the other is likely to be biased, particularly towards a null result. It also means that there is great value in trying to understand
whether other factors might influence the campaign behavior of President Bush, if only to
specify an instrumental variable model that might allow us to better understand the effect
of such visits on Senate elections.3 What other factors might predict President Bush’s behavior? From our perspective there are two interesting possibilities. The first is whether
President Bush campaigned in those states that might help him or his party in presidential
politics. The second is whether campaign visits were designed as either rewards for legislative support, or to even cultivate that support from among people who had previously not
supported him. We address these possibilities next, particularly interested in finding those
variables that might predict campaigning but not general election support (or vice versa).

0.1

Presidential Elections and Midterm Campaigning

Previous research on presidential campaigning suggests that three factors determine the
distribution of resources to a state: 1) competiveness, 2) Electoral College votes, and 3) media
market costs ?. If a president is campaigning to improve his chances in future elections, we
might expect him to campaign in states that are desirable targets. Since media market costs
has more to do with the purchasing of television time, we focus our efforts here on these other
two possibilities. As noted earlier, we measure competitiveness with the margin of victory
from the preceding election. We measure Electoral College value by comparing measuring
how different a state’s number of Electoral College votes are from other states that have
Senate elections during that same cycle. It is important to be aware of differences between
3

At this stage of our research, we are not yet prepared to fully resolve this problem and discuss our other
results accordingly.
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the first set of midterms when President Bush could face re-election, and his second set in
which he could at best influence the prospects of another candidate (whom we now know to
be John McCain).
Figure 2 shows a box-and-whiskers plot for the competitiveness variable by both year
and whether or not President Bush campaigned. In 2002, the states visited by the president
were more competitive in the 2000 election than those that he did not visit. Yet despite
the clear difference in the medians, the distributions overlap notably. A similar pattern
emerges in 2006, though the president is more—rather than less—willing to visit states in
which he was less competitive in 2004. Perhaps more importantly, visited races have less
variation in the distribution than other races for both years. So while competitiveness does
not predict presidential campaign visits, it does seem to hold some potential for explaining
Senate election results (particularly because it is temporally prior).
Figure 2: Margin of Victory in Previous Presidential Election by Year and Midterm Campaigning

Figure 3 shows the same distributions for the second variable of interest, the relative
14

Figure 3: Electoral College Votes of States with Senate Elections by Year and Midterm
Campaigning

value of a state’s Electoral College votes during that midterm cycle. Once again we find
that there is little noticeable differences between those states visited by President Bush and
the others in either 2002 or 2006. In 2002, the distributions are very similar with almost no
differences. And in 2006 the states visited by President Bush are almost all exactly at the
median!

Legislative Strategy and Midterm Campaigning
If midterm campaigning is not affected by the politics of presidential elections, it is
possible that presidential politics seep in through the avenue of legislative strategy. Campaign visits might be used as a reward to ideological stalwarts or presidential supporters,
particularly as those visits often help legislators raise significant campaign cash
To examine these possibilities, we look at the relationship between two variables and
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midterm campaign visits. The first is the well-known NOMINATE score, a measure of
Senator ideology. As discussed above, this is the value assigned to the incumbent legislator
in the previous year. The distributions for this variable by year and campaign visit are
displayed in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Histograms of Incumbent Legislator Ideology by Year and Midterm Campaign
Visits

The most striking observation to come from this graph is a difference between the two
years. In 2002, there is seemingly little relationship between legislative ideology and the
midterm visits by President Bush. While there is a slightly higher likelihood of President
Bush visiting a seat where the incumbent is conservative (40% of states with legislators
holding a score larger than zero received a visit, compared to 30% of those at zero or smaller,
the differences are not substantial. However, in 2006 the President showed a far more notable
bias toward visiting states where the incumbent seat was held by a conservative.4 A difference
4

Among the three seats in which President Bush visited states with moderate-to-liberal incumbents, two
of them were open seat races.
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of means test shows this difference to be statistically significant at the .10 level (one-tailed
test, t = −1.52).
Although this finding does not help resolve the larger endogeneity problem, it does provide
an interesting bit of substantive insight into the Bush Administration’s presidential visits.
This is nicely illustrated by comparing the types races with moderate or liberal incumbents
visited by President Bush in 2002 and 2006. In both years these seats were all held by
incumbent Democratic legislators, but in 2002 only one was an open seat race (vacated
at Paul Wellstone’s unfortunate death) whereas in 2006 two of the three were open seats.
While this is not a substantial number of cases on which to build a systematic argument,
it highlights the increased importance of competitiveness in 2006 when the president was
not popular. Rather than go into more seats with endangered incubments, he stuck to races
with endangered conservative incumbents and a handful of open seats where he did not have
to deal with incumbent Democrats.
Figure 5: Electoral College Votes of States with Senate Elections by Year and Midterm
Campaigning
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Figure 5 shows the effect of our other variable – presidential support in the preceding year.
Here a similar pattern emerges, with there being almost no difference in the distribution on
this variable across states visited by President Bush and others in 2002. In 2006, the president
was more likely to avoid seats held by non-supporters than those held by supporters. While
he did visit a few states in the 30-40 range, the vast majority of those seats he visited had
been held by incumbents who stuck by the unpopular president.5
Although there are some obvious idiosyncracies in how these legislative variables bleed
into presidential campaigning, the analysis in this section does suggest a way in which
presidential popularity (or perhaps lame-duck status) might influence the calculus underling
such decisions. Competitveness is still the overriding factor—President Bush visited 72% of
all open seat races, compared to 24% of those held by incumbents— but the evidence suggests
that legislative politics influences these calculations at the margins when the president is less
popular.

The Effects of Presidential Politics on Midterm Elections
Our investigation into the causes of midterm campaign visits provides some substantive
insight into the strategies used by the Bush Administration. Unfortunately there is not
enough to provide a clear solution to the methodological issues that arise in trying to determine the effect of presidential visits on Senate elections. That said, our expectation based
on the earlier analyses is that the consequence of the endogeneity should be to bias any
estimates toward zero or negativity.6 With this in mind, our larger goal is to examine the
effect of presidential politics more more broadly defined on Senate elections during the Bush
Administration.
Toward that end, we examine three possible ways that the fate of Republican senato5

A one-tailed t-test (−1.49) again verifies that this result is significant at the .10 level.
Indeed, we see this as being equivalent in form to the well-studied endogeneity bias in studying incumbent
spending, one which the effect is always to underestimate effects rather than overestimate them.
6
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rial candidates were balanced by the decisions of the Bush Administration. In addition to
presidential campaign visits, we also consider the possibility that underlying popularity of
the president and support for his legislative agenda might also affect elections. To keep our
focus on presidential poolitics, we use a minimal set of control variables to capture other
elements of the electoral context. These are whether or not there is a Republican incumbent
in the race and whether or not the seat is open.7 We provide our results from an ordinary
least squares regression model in Table 2, estimated separately for 2002 and 2006.
First consider the results for 2002. Although the model does a good job of explaining the
variance in our 33 cases, only one of the variables in the model is statistically significant.
Table 1: Effect of Presidential Politics on Midterm Election Results
Variables
Bush Electoral Success
Bush Campaign Visits
Presidential Support
Open Seat
Republican Incumbent
Constant
N
F
Adjusted R2

2002
β s.e.
0.32 0.14**
-3.26 3.83
0.01 0.10
12.69 7.05*
22.73 7.81**
38.79 3.32**
33
12.63*
0.65

2006
β s.e.
0.40 0.16*
-2.46 4.35
-0.31 0.16**
4.11 11.12
38.41 9.77**
40.60 4.25**
33
10.28
0.59

Difference
β s.e.
0.08 0.21
0.80 5.79
-0.32 0.19*
-8.58 13.10
15.69 12.48
1.81 5.38
66
0.21

* p < .10, ** p < .05, two-tailed tests.

Discussion
While our analysis led us to mostly null results (and at times unexpected results), this is
merely a preliminary examination of the Bush administration’s campaigning choices in the
midterm elections and what effect those choices may have had on the elections. However,
some cursory conclusions can be made. As expected, President Bush campaigned in states
7

We have checked our results with additional controls for spending by the candidates, but our results do
not change. We opt for the simpler model in the interest of parsimony.
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Table 2: Effect of Presidential Politics
2002
Variables
β s.e.
Bush Electoral Success 0.12 0.14
Bush Campaign Visits 12.86 6.43*
Presidential Support 0.26 0.12
Open Seat 7.60 6.46
Republican Incumbent 12.27 7.75**
Campaign * Support -0.29 0.10**
Constant 32.53 3.61**
N
33
F
15.00*
Adjusted R2
0.72

on Midterm Election Results
2006
Difference
β s.e.
β s.e.
0.36 0.15*
0.24 0.21
10.79 8.03
-2.07 10.22
-0.20 0.17
-0.46 0.20*
4.61 11.53
-12.21 12.92
35.74 9.42** 23.47 12.41*
-0.21 0.11
0.08 0.15
37.01 4.46**
4.48 5.71
33
66
10.05*
2c0.49
0.63

* p < .10, ** p < .05, two-tailed tests.

with close races. This dispels the idea that presidential visits (at least by this president) are
intended to be merely ornamental favors to the candidate; the president visited states where
he believed he could make a difference, not states where the candidate was sure to win or
lose.
Presidential campaigning for certain Senate candidates in 2002 did not seem to have
much of an impact; there was no real difference between candidates he campaigned for and
candidates he did not campaign for. Surprisingly, in 2006, President Bush had a slight
positive impact (though not statistically significant) on the elections of the candidates he
did campaign for. There is not much of a difference between the states, and President
Bush’s success in the previous election also did not appear to have much of an impact, so
there is no real evidence that presidential campainging for Senate candidates is a result of
the president’s personal electoral strategy.
However, his campaign strategy could have been influenced by his wider legislative
agenda. Preident Bush made campaign appearances for candidates who supported his agenda
at least a large majority of the time, and he also make appearances for challengers of liberal
Democrats. We conclude that President Bush ultimately influenced at most three races–
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Norm Coleman, Greg Ganske, and potentially Jim Talent. Despite his intention to impact
the Senate races, the impact of President Bush’s midterm campaign strategy has been mainly
symbolic.
This leads us to a few preliminary conclusions about the Bush administration. First,
the president does not appear to change his campaign strategy much between 2002 and
2006. Most likely this is because political considerations - particularly the competitiveness
of the race - matter most and everything else matters at the margin. What that suggests is
that presidential popularity may not impact things as much as we might expect otherwise.
Second, Bush’s popularity in 2002 probably did impact presidential elections. In part this
occurred in those places where the president visited, though his ability to influence many
races is limited by the above factors. Past this, support of the president was influential in
those states where the president did not campaign. Here it was only through support of the
president’s legislative agenda that seemed to matter heavily.
In the future, we intend to extend our analysis to include more midterm elections and
different presidents. Aside from competitiveness, is there anything that different presidents
may commonly look for when deciding which Senate candidates to make appearances for?
In particular, we will focus more on discerning the president’s legislative agenda and what
effect it has on his campaign strategy.
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